“The FAA simply cannot shy away from holding Boeing fully accountable when it is failing to deliver on safety.”
[WASHINGTON, DC] – Today, U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Chair of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI), delivered opening remarks at a hearing titled “FAA Oversight of Boeing’s Broken Safety Culture.” The hearing featured testimony from Federal Aviation (FAA) Administrator Michael Whitaker.
“Today’s hearing is our third as part of this ongoing inquiry, and it’s a critical step in understanding how the FAA oversight of Boeing has or has not compelled Boeing to address the fundamental flaws in its safety culture. And we have said it is a safety culture that is broken, that Boeing has put profits and speed of production ahead of quality and safety, and ultimately, that failing is at the core of its current difficulties,” said Blumenthal.
Blumenthal entered into the record a Majority staff memorandum released earlier today that reveals new details of Boeing’s safety failures, “The findings by this Subcommittee today show that, in fact, not much has changed at Boeing since 2018 and 2019, when the crashes occurred. The findings about actual practices show that Boeing continues to prioritize the speed of production and profits over safety and quality, and the Department of Justice has taken action which reflect the potential criminality of those practices. In my view, the agency has to be proactive and aggressive in oversight, not reactive.”
Blumenthal continued, “The FAA simply cannot shy away from holding Boeing fully accountable when it is failing to deliver on safety. We cannot wait for another tragedy to act effectively,” concluded Blumenthal.
Video of Blumenthal’s opening remarks can be found here. The full transcript of Blumenthal’s opening remarks can be found below.
Chair Blumenthal: The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations comes to order. Good afternoon. Thank you, Mr. Whitaker, for being here today. Thank you to my colleagues who have joined us.
Just over five years ago, Boeing and the FAA were thrust into the spotlight—unwelcome but inevitable—when two Boeing 737 MAX aircraft crashed in less than six months, killing 346 people. The aftermath of those crashes raised troubling questions about the role the FAA played in overseeing and approving changes to the design of Boeing aircraft. Americans were assured by the FAA that problems with Boeing’s aircraft were addressed when the FAA allowed the MAX to return to the sky in November 2020. Yet just over three years later, this January, a door plug blew off a Boeing 737 MAX midflight. That incident is seemingly indicative of a broader systematic set of issues that the FAA still has not addressed.
Our Subcommittee began its inquiry into quality and safety practices at Boeing about eight months ago, following whistleblower allegations that shortcuts have been taken during the manufacturing of Boeing’s 777 and the 787 aircraft. Today’s hearing is our third as part of this ongoing inquiry, and it’s a critical step in understanding how the FAA oversight of Boeing has or has not compelled Boeing to address the fundamental flaws in its safety culture. And we have said it is a safety culture that is broken, that Boeing has put profits and speed of production ahead of quality and safety, and ultimately, that failing is at the core of its current difficulties.
In June, the Subcommittee released new findings detailing concerns from whistleblowers, including about Boeing’s ongoing mismanagement of nonconforming parts and removal of quality inspections. Today, we have released a new memorandum that reveals previously nonpublic information about very concerning practices and procedures still occurring at Boeing. This memo reveals that many of Boeing’s employees still feel pressure to prioritize speed over quality, raising serious safety concerns, and this survey is illustrated behind me. According to it, conducted by Boeing in May—I should emphasize, conducted by Boeing—“Schedule pressure is still significant.” The survey found that one in three Boeing employees said that schedule pressure may cause their team to lower its standard. That is a profoundly disturbing finding.
The memo also reveals that FAA found more than 100 alleged instances of noncompliance with federal regulations, and Boeing’s own procedures as part of a special audit examination of Boeing and its supplier, Spirit AeroSystems, after the door plug blowout. The FAA found alleged noncompliance across multiple crucial stages of the production process. For example, the FAA found that “Boeing is failing to ensure many of their employees have the appropriate education, training, skills, or experience to effectively perform their assigned tasks.” Your report—the FAA also found that numerous instances of Boeing struggling to track and secure nonconforming aircraft parts—this isn’t just about storing parts correctly. It’s a process that is critical to ensuring that these nonconforming parts do not make their way into airplanes. And now, as the Subcommittee reported in June, deficiencies continue to plague Boeing's quality inspection procedures. In some facilities, Boeing personnel are allowed to inspect their own work. Let me repeat—in some facilities, Boeing employees actually inspect their own work. The FAA has acknowledged to the Subcommittee that this practice appeared to pose an inherent conflict of interest. Yet the program has continued.
The findings by this Subcommittee today show that, in fact, not much has changed at Boeing since 2018 and 2019, when the crashes occurred. The findings about actual practices show that Boeing continues to prioritize the speed of production and profits over safety and quality, and the Department of Justice has taken action which reflect the potential criminality of those practices. In my view, the agency has to be proactive and aggressive in oversight, not reactive. Now, more than five years after the tragic 2018 and 2019 crashes, the same questions persist about what the FAA is doing to ensure that Boeing is properly designing and building its aircraft.
Under your direction, Mr. Whitaker, the FAA swiftly reacted to the door plug blowout this year, but clearly something more significant reform is needed. For example, the FAA issued a rule requiring Boeing to implement a safety management system, SMS, earlier this year. The FAA is giving Boeing three years to fully comply, despite the fact that Boeing first agreed to implement an SMS as partof a settlement with the FAA nearly a decade ago. Prioritizing safety must permeate every aspect of the company. Without a culture that genuinely prioritizes quality over profit, safety over speed, and transparency over the bottom line, Boeing simply cannot succeed as a company. And that is becoming more and more apparent with time.
The FAA’s oversight of Boeing and its safety culture as a strong independent regulator is an essential part of the company’s success. Its own success depends on the FAA being strong in its scrutiny. And that means the FAA must heed Boeing's deeds, not their words, and do more to scrutinize Boeing’s safety practices. It must review its process of delegating critical authorities to Boeing through the Organization Designation Authorization, or ODA, which has been a persistent and continuing issue for us, and for me personally, over the years. It must conduct unannounced audits—unannounced—to ensure compliance. It must ensure that whistleblowers feel safe to speak up. And know their concerns will be addressed when they do and that they will see the results of those concerns as expressed. And it must compel compliance when necessary.
The FAA simply cannot shy away from holding Boeing fully accountable when it is failing to deliver on safety. We cannot wait for another tragedy to act effectively.
Today with us in the audience is a member of the Handley family who lost her mother 35 years ago when a cargo door blew off a Boeingaircraft. In a letter to the Subcommittee, her family said, “We recount the details of this accident that changed all our lives to point out that 35 years later the same issues have not been rectified. More lives have been lost. More profits have been put before people by the manufacturers, the FAA, and by the airlines.” I ask without objection that that letter be made part of the record.
Administrator Whitaker, it is time that all of us listen to those really powerful words of warning. It is beyond time for the FAA to take, in my view, a more proactive role. I hope that today’s hearing is an opportunity for you to share the steps that you intend to take on behalf of the FAA to hold Boeing to the high standards that apply to manufacturing of aircraft. You are still less than a year into the job, and now is your moment to take that leadership role. That is why we are here today.
Finally, I want to acknowledge the Boeing employees who make these aircraft and the unions that represent them. Two weeks ago, more than 30,000 Boeing employees with the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers went on strike after rejecting Boeing’s contract offer. I stand with these workers and urge Boeing and the IAM to come together to negotiate in good faith to reach a fair agreement that addresses the workers’ concerns. They are the ones who make these airplanes, and they are the ones who have come forward to us—more than 15 whistleblowers already from your ranks and others, and their expressions of support for our ongoing inquiry have been immensely important to inspire and inform our work. With that, I turn to the Ranking Member for his opening statement.
-30-